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Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages. (Cardozo, J.)I
When one says the first word on a controversial subject, he
should not delude himself into thinking that he will have an
opportunity to say the last. (Hubert W. Smith, M.D., LL.B.)2
It is no longer disputed that the physician has a duty to inform
his patient of the nature of the treatment proposed by the physician
and the risks involved in that treatment. Because of this required
disclosure the patient is better able to "determine what shall be
done with his own body"3 by making an informed decision whether
or not to undergo treatment. Yet, both the law and medicine are
far from the "last say' 4 concerning certain particularly difficult
problems which arise within the scope of the physician's communi-
cation to the patient and the patient's assent to treatment. In this
process of communication and assent, which is commonly referred
to as informed consent, serious abuses of the physician-patient
fiduciary relationship5 can result if the physician knowingly with-
holds information from the patient, or, for some reason, if the
patient's consent remains uninformed despite his receiving seem-
ingly adequate information from the physician. For medico-legal 6
and practical reasons there has been a tendency to avoid develop-
* B.A., 1967, University of California, Berkeley; 1968, Oxford University;
J.D., 1971, University of California School of Law, Berkeley; Member
of the California Bar Association.
1 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
2 Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from
Patient Sick With Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349, 349
(1945-47) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
3 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105
N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
4 Smith, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5 See generally 2 D. LouisEmL & Wmimaims, MEDIcAL MALPRACTEcE (1970)
[hereinafter cited as LoUIsELL & WILIAms].
6 Note, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient of Treatment: Battery or
Negligence?, 34 So. CAL. L. REv. 217, 224-25 (1961).
"Decisions which discourage doctors from exercising their highly
trained skills to better the human lot should be carefully considered.
If the increasing trend of malpractice claims continues, the relation-
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ing narrow or rigid rules for deciding issues involving informed
consent.7 Nonetheless, most aspects of informed consent have been
given ample consideration, and broad principles have evolved
relating to the extent of the physician's duty and the content of
his disclosure.
The general duty of the physician is to inform a patient effec-
tively of all aspects of the treatment which the physician knows,
or should know, will affect the patient's decision to undergo or ab-
stain from treatment.8 Professor D. Louisell and Dr. H. Williams,
state:
ship between doctor and patient might well become so strained that
doctors will be reluctant to take chances which might save many
lives."
See also, B. FiCARRA, SuRGicAL AND ALTn MALPRACTICE 41 (1968),
where the author states:
"The very concept of confidence is one of mutuality of giving and
receiving and is not to be considered as a one-way street. The possi-
bility of having a legal action brought against most physicians or
surgeons is highly probable today. Thus the practicing doctor has
accepted it as a definite occupational hazard. He fully realizes that
the patient to whom he renders care of a major or minor nature may
eventually bring him to court. When a physician is constantly under
threats of legal actions, he inevitably arouses within himself a de-
fensive instinct which by gradual attrition erodes his professional
humanitarian and altruistic ambitions. As the noble assets of the
medical profession are gradually eroded, it is the patient who loses the
boundless benefits that can occur to him by the doctor who is un-
fettered by legal threats."
See generally Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment,
11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 249 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Oppenheim].
7 Because of the unique nature of each case, involving potentially in-
finite combinations of ailments, possible treatments, and individual
psychological and emotional components, the promulgation of rules
is difficult in what has been considered the discretionary realm of the
physician. See, e.g., Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Ther-
apy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 643 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Waltz &
Scheuneman]:
"Because the physician's decision must be made in light of the con-
dition and psychological disposition of a given patient in a particular
case, it is meaningless to speak of a customary standard delineating
the scope of a privilege to withhold risk information."
8 See generally C. STETLER & A. MoRiTz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE
LAw (1962); Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Mal-
practice "Wonder Drug", 31 Mo. L. REv. 29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Karchmer]; Oppenhelm, supra note 6, at 256; Plante, An Analysis of
"Informed Consent", 36 FoRDum L. REV. 639, 653 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Plante]; Smith, supra note 2, at 352; Waltz, supra note 7; 34
So. CAL. L. REv., supra note 6, at 223; Note, 109 U. PENN. L. REv. 768
(1961); Comment, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 137 (1966); Comment, 4 DUQUESNE
U. L. REv. 450, 451 (1966).
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[W]here circumstances permit, the patient should be told (1)
the diagnosis, (2) the general nature of the contemplated pro-
cedure, (3) the risks involved, (4) the prospects of success, (5)
the prognosis if the procedure is not performed, and (6) alterna-
tive methods of treatment, if any.9
Proper disclosure does not mean exhaustive disclosure. 10 There are
exceptions which make disclosure requirements consonant with
the daily realities of medical practice. Where risks ought to be
common knowledge they need not be disclosed." The physician is
not required to continue to disclose risks which the patient knows
because of previous experience with the treatment to be admin-
istered.12 There is also a considerable body of both law' 3 and com-
mentary 4 supporting the principle that where an emergency exists
the physician need not obtain the consent of the patient for oper-
ative procedures. Consent to a particular plan or treatment does
not bind the physician to that exact plan:
The law does not insist that a surgeon shall perform every opera-
tion according to plans and specifications approved in advance
by the patient, and carefully tucked away in his office-safe for
courtroom purposes.' 5
Those aspects of informed consent which have not been given
sufficient consideration relate to: 1) acceptable justifications for
failure to disclose material risks; 2) whether the proper cause of
action is in battery or negligence; and 3) problems arising from
difficulties in the communication process between physician and
patient.
0 LOujisELL & WfLfzAms, supra note 5, at 594.43-.44.
30 See generally Karchmer, supra note 8; McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 VmN. L. REv. 381(1957); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
V~M. L. Rnv. 549 (1959); Oppenheim, supra note 6.
11 Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Starnes v.
Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968).
12 Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964).
13 See generally Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943);
Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Delahunt v. Finton, 244
Mich. 226, 221 N.W. 168 (1928); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377
P.2d 520 (1962); DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d
623 (2d Dept. 1965).
14 See generally Kelly, The Physician, the Patient, and the Consent, 8
K-AN. L. Rzv. 405 (1960); Levin, Consent to Medical Procedures, 1963
INs. L. J. 711; McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized
Medical Treatment, supra note 10; Plante, supra note 8, at 653; Powell,
Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 Mn. L. REv. 189, 202 (1961); Note,
Consent as a Prerequisite to a Surgical Operation, 14 Cnqw L. Rnv.
161, 168 (1940); Note, 26 MrtcH. L. REv. 561, 562 (1928).
15 See Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943).
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II. MAY INFORMATION EVER BE WITHHELD?
The major issue in this article is whether a physician may ever
knowingly refrain from informing a mentally competent adult
patient of a risk involved in a proposed treatment when the knowl-
edge of the risk would be material 16 to the patient's decision of
whether to undergo that treatment. In nearly all of the cases 17 and
articles' s which deal with, or touch upon, informed consent, there
is a general recognition that "a physician is privileged to withhold
information on specific risks when disclosure would seem detri-
mental to his patient's well being."' 9 The grounds usually used to
support such an exception are that the patient "might refuse neces-
16 There are two sets presently proposed to determine whether or not
a fact would materially affect a patient's judgment. The prevalent test
is stated by LOUISELL & WmLiAms, supra note 5, at 594.50:
"The usual way of showing this is for the plantiff to testify that if he
had been told of the dangers he would not have consented to the
procedure. If he does not so testify, and if this fact does not otherwise
appear in the case, the element of proximate cause is absent and the
defendant will prevail." (Footnotes omitted).
The problem with this test is that injured patients who cannot prove
malpractice negligence or patients claming damages for battery may
be too readily inclined to allow present knowledge to influence their
appraisal of past judgment. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Doctrines of
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Informed Consent, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 182, 185
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Johnson], writes:
"Generally speaking, it is safe to speculate that when a patient selects
a physician and places confidence in him, the patient will submit to
those procedures recommended by the doctor. But at the trial the
patient-plaintiff will certainly testify that 'had I known of that risk,
I would never, never have consented.' The jury may well agree."
The realities suggested by Johnson tend to minimize the value of the
Louisell & Williams test. More recently, Waltz & Scheunemann, supra
note 7, at 647, suggest what appears to be a preferable test:
"[tihe proper question is whether a reasonable person in the plain-
tiff's position would have withheld consent to a therapy had all ma-
terial risks been disclosed."
'7 See generally Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964); Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
317 P.2d 170 (1957); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Woods v. Brumlop,
71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
18 See generally LOUISELL & WILL A S, supra note 5; Johnson, supra
note 16; Oppenheim, supra note 6; Smith, supra note 2; Smith, Ante-
cedent Grounds of Liability in Practice Surgery, 14 RocKY MT. L. Rsv.
233 (1942); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7; 109 U. PENN. L. REV.,
supra note 8; Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55
CAL. L. REv. 1396 (1967).
19 See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7, at 641.
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sary treatment,"20 or that such information may cause unnecessary
anxiety and hinder the success of the treatment.21 No articles have
dealt in depth with the implications of this exception. A few cases
have been decided in part on this basis.22 Such an exception cannot
be justified.
Notwithstanding this area of contention, there are certain estab-
lished situations in which a physician is neither required to inform
the patient of the risks involved in a proposed treatment, nor is he
required to obtain the consent of the patient. The law is clear that
the consent of a minor 23 or a person who is non compos mentis2 4
is meaningless and authority to proceed with treatment must come
from a third party. Where an emergency exists the rules governing
informed consent are generally held in abeyance.25
As well as the established exceptions noted above, there are
certain limitations to the extent of disclosure which the physician
must make. He need not disclose every possible detail of the
treatment and its potential risks. Many commentators express the
opinion that reasonable disclosure does not mean a physician must
inform the patient of all possible results no matter how remote.26
Commentators also recognize that extremely detailed and technical
explanations of all of the possibilities can have an adverse effect
on any patient.27 Professional medical practice often dictates which
20 LOuISELL & WnLamus, supra note 5, at 594.46. This however, begs the
conclusion that the treatment is "necessary," when it should be up
to the patient to determine necessity in relation to his own body.
21 Id.
22 Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52
Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).
23 See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Bowers v. Tal-
madge, 159 So. 2d 883 (Fla. App. 1963); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212
Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky.
App. 1952); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967);
Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936); Kelly, supra note
14; Powell, supra note 14, at 207, 14 Cnm. L. REv., supra note 14; 26
M C H. L. REv., supra note 14, at 565.
24 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953); Pratt v. Davis,
224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Kelly, supra note 14; Powell, supra
note 14.
25 See the sources cited at notes 13 and 14, supra.
26 See generally Karchmer, supra note 8; McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, supra note 10; McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Malpractice Practitioners, supra note
10; Oppenheim, supra note 6.
27 See generally Karchmer, supra note 8; McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, supra note 10; McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Malpractice Practitioners, supra note
10; Oppenheim, supra note 6.
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facts or possibilities a physician need not disclose to even the most
stable patient.28 The physician's claim that his withholding of infor-
mation was in accordance with normal standards of practice will
be subject to expert testimony concerning both medical judgment
in general29 and the specific medical practice related to the par-
ticular type of treatment in issue.8 0
The difficulty arises in deciding whether the physician may
withhold information for other reasons. If so, what are those reasons
and what is their justification? Before discussing this issue a basic
distinction must be made. The problem of informed consent which
will be dealt with in this portion of the article involves a physician
who undertakes a treatment without disclosing a risk which would
affect the patient's judgment about whether to undergo treatment,
and that risk becomes actual damage during the course of treat-
ment.31 This is a true informed consent problem. This must be
distinguished from the situation in which the physician goes beyond
the scope of the treatment which he originally described to the
patient and in fact treats some other or additional part of the
patient's body.32 This second type of problem is more aptly de-
scribed as exceeding the scope of treatment and will be discussed
in section III.
Once the physician ventures outside the well established ex-
ceptions to informed consent, he enters a major gray area of
the law. May the physician knowingly withhold information con-
cerning certain risks from the patient because, in his judgment,
"the patient's mental and emotional condition was such that it
would have been therapeutically unwise to inform him of the
risk"?3 3 Are there grounds for the physician to "prove the reason-
ableness of any lesser disclosure"34 outside the well established
exceptions? Such possibilities have been so frequently mentioned
in passing without careful consideration that they ought to be put
to rest. A few cases have held for a physician-defendant on such
28 See generally Dietze v. King, 184 F.Supp. 944, 949 (E.D. Va. 1960);
Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 396-97, 424 P.2d 488, 494-95 (1967);
Johnson, supra note 16; Oppenheim, supra note 6, at 259, 260.
29 See McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, supra note 10, at 434.
30 Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Di Filippo v. Pres-
ton, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
31 E.g., Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). Wilson
v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
32 E.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
33 See LouisEL. & WniLLAms, supra note 5, at 594.62.
34 See 55 CAL. L. REV., supra note 18.
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grounds,3 5 and straight forward analysis reveals that these cases
are not only weak in their use of precedent, but also lack any cri-
tical consideration of what the doctrine involves.
In Patrick v. Sedwick where a subtotal thyroidectomy was to be
performed, Dr. Sydnam, the physician who advised the undertaking
of surgery, "told the plaintiff that [a subtotal thyroidectomy] was
nothing more than a tonsillectomy. 36 The patient met the operating
physician, Dr. Sedwick, "for a few minutes in the operating room
just prior to surgery."37 In neither encounter with either physician
was the patient-plaintiff told that the possibility of paralysis to
vocal cords was one to five percent in all such operations performed
regardless of the surgeon's care or technique. Dr. Sedwick's decision
as to "(w) hether information concerning serious risks of surgery
should be given or withheld ... had been based upon his talks
about the patient with Dr. Sydnam, the referring physician.13 8 Dr.
Sydnam's "notes indicated that the patient was a nervous and ap-
prehensive person."3 9 While the court did not make clear whether
this was a specifically pleaded defense in the court below, it drew
the conclusion that this was a sound basis for limited disclosure
of risks stating:
There is good law in support of the argument made by the de-
fendant in his brief . .. that doctors frequently tailor the extent
of their preoperative warnings to the particular patient to avoid
the unnecessary anxiety and apprehension which such appraisal
might arouse in the mind of the patient.4 o
In determining that physicians could "tailor the extent of their
preoperative warnings,"41 the court made no attempt to distinguish
between entirely withholding notice of material risks and giving a
modest description of the possible results.
The court then cited three decisions in support of its position.42
A careful reading of those cases evidences the weak basis the
Patrick court used as "good law"43 to support the proposition that
doctors may so tailor their preoperative warnings.
35 Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964);Nishi v. Hartwell, 52
Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).






42 Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Col. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170,
(1957); Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
43 Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453, 458 (Alaska 1964).
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In Roberts v. Wood, the first case cited in Patrick, the court
found that "[t]here is no evidence that [the physician] misrepre-
sented the serious nature of the operation or failed to inform the
patient of its attendant dangers."44 In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
University, the second case cited, the California Supreme Court set
out what has come to be one of the important modern statements
of the duty of a physician to disclose facts "which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the pro-
posed treatment."'4 5 The court simply did not deal with an allegation
by the defendant physician that his limited disclosure had been on
the grounds that the patient was unduly apprehensive.4 6 The third
case cited in Patrick was Di Filippo v. Preston where the defense of
44 Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962). This case
is perhaps the only solid basis for the holding in Patrick v. Sedwick,
391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964). In this case the patient submitted to a
second subtotal thyroidectomy operation in five years (1954 and 1959).
The physician told her that the second operation "would be similar to
the one she had undergone in 1954." Roberts v. Wood, supra at 583.
The court noted that she was to undergo a gynecological operation and
subtotal thyroidectomy at the same time during the 1959 operation, and
in light of the patient's emotional state as well as the fact that the
patient had "previously experienced a thyroidectomy," the court was
"of the opinion the patient was properly advised of the seriousness
of the operation." Id. The plaintiff did not enter evidence that she
was not aware of the risks from the previous treatment (see generally
Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964), cited in note 12,
supra, concerning knowledge from previous treatment), and the
materiality of the risk was never dealt with. It is also not clear from
the decision whether the defendant in Roberts v. Woods ever raised
the same defense allowed in Patrick v. Sedwick, since the Roberts v.
Woods court found "no evidence" of failure by the physician "to
inform the patient of (the operation's) attendant dangers." 206
F. Supp. at 583.
45 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d
560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957)
46 Id. Salgo is less in point than Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp. 579
(S.D. Ala. 1962). Without dealing with the specific problem the court
suggested, as many articles have done, that full disclosure "may well
result in alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and
who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in
fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks
by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself." 154
Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181. In supporting this general pro-
nouncement, as well as the statement that "a certain amount of dis-
cretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent," Id., the court cited Hunt v. Brad-
shaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Simone v. Sabo, 37 CaL2d
253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
21 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). None of these three cases either
involved or mentioned withholding of disclosure by the physician in
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withholding disclosure to assuage the patient's fears was also never
raised.47
In Nishi v. Hartwell, the plaintiff-patient, who was a dentist, was
paralysed from the waist down during a thoracic aortography and
subsequently died.4 s The purpose of the diagnostic procedure was
to determine the existence of aneurysm, and involved an exposure
of an artery in the inguinal region, followed by an injection of radio-
opaque contrast medium through a catheter so that the aorta would
be outlined under x-ray. The defendant-physicians did not disclose to
the patient, Dr. Nishi, that paralysis and death were collateral
hazards associated with the use of the chemical Urokon as the radio-
opaque contrast medium. It was uncontradicted at trial that there
was no disclosure of the risk associated with Urokon, and that the
injury to Dr. Nishi occurred as a result of the use of Urokon in the
thoracic aortography.49 The suit was dismissed at the close of the
plaintiff's case, because the plaintiff failed to come forward with
independent expert testimony to prove a prime facie case of negli-
gence.5 0
order to keep from alarming an already apprehensive patient. It
is interesting to note that Cardoza, in his often quoted Schloendorff
decision, apparently dealing with the problem of apprehensive patients
stated only that "[there may be cases where a patient ought not to
be advised of a contemplated operation until shortly before the
appointed hour." Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, supra
at 134, 105 N.E. at 95. The implication is quite strong that Cardozo
felt that the patient should be advised under all circumstances, the
timing of the disclosure notwithstanding.
47 See Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961). In this
case the defense was that "it was not a practice of surgeons in the
Wilmington area to warn the patients of the possibility of resultant
injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerves from a thyroidectomy."
Id. at 550, 173 A.2d at 339. There was no defense raised of concern
for an emotionally ill-prepared patient
48 Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 189, 473 P.2d 116, 118 (1970). The patient
was originally the plaintiff, but after his death his wife maintained the
suit on behalf of his estate and herself.
49 Id.
50 The plaintiff tried the case on a battery theory. Had battery been the
appropriate form of action, expert testimony should have been irrele-
vant and the proper question should have been whether there was
consent to the touching. As a result of this battery approach, the
plaintiff apparently never prepared to come forth with expert wit-
nesses to support the plaintiff's case. The only physicians appearing
were the defendants, as adverse witnesses. The majority of the court
gave weight to the physicians' testimony without going so far as to
consider them the expert witnesses of the plaintiff. On the basis of
the case as presented by the plaintiff without independent expert
witnesses, the court upheld the dismissal after presentation of the
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The court apparently had a number of grounds for its holding.
Primary among these was the fact that the physicians felt that dis-
closure would further frighten Dr. Nishi, who was already anxious
about his continually deteriorating health.54 One of the physician-
defendants testified that since Dr. Nishi was "a professional man...
a dentist," he knew that with every injection "a hazard exists, so
that it didn't seem necessary to tell this professional man, 'Now is
it a hazard?' He knows it. ' 52 The court discussed the fact that this
diagnostic treatment was being undertaken to determine whether
or not Dr. Nishi would have to go to Texas for surgery by a promi-
nent surgeon. The prospect of avoiding the trip to Texas through
the use of this diagnostic treatment "delighted" Dr. and Mrs. Nishi.
The court apparently felt this was a positive benefit to Dr. Nishi.53
Finally, turning to the testimony of a second defendant-physician,
the court noted that this defendant felt Urokon to be the only satis-
factory chemical available, and that there was a minimal chance
(two in 3,800) of death from its use.5 4 In order to underscore its
point, in the only footnote in the decision, the court cited authority
which established that at least half of the surgeons in the United
States used Urokon "despite the existence of other media considered
by some to be less toxic," but which did not facilitate the best pos-
plaintiff's case. While the court was prepared to say that, "[t]he right
of a plaintiff to relief does not depend upon his allegations or his
theory of the case" (52 Haw. at 191, 473 P.2d at 119), it is clear
that under the plaintiff's theory of battery it was to plaintiff's
prejudice and detriment not to come forward with expert witnesses,
whose appearance presumably would have at least gotten the case to
the jury. The dissenting opinion of Abe, J. discusses this problem.
See section III of this article for a discussion of the battery-negligence
question.
51 Id. at 193, 473 P.2d at 120.
52 Id. This testimony, cited by the court, appears to give a second and
independent reason for the court's decision, i.e., that the patient already
knew the risks. Certainly the normal risks involved in routine injec-
tions do not include paralysis or death, but rather a small possibility
of infection. Therefore, this testimony offered no grounds of defense
whatsoever.
53 Id. One wonders whether the "delight" of the patient actually re-
sulted from the fact that his physicians had recommended a "fairly
simple procedure" as a possible alternative to a trip to Texas for
diagnosis or surgery. Had Dr. Nishi been told that the proposed treat-
ment involved a risk of paralysis or death, no matter how slight, he
might have elected to undertake such risks only at the hands of well-
known heart specialists in Houston.
54 Id. The court's position might have been stronger had they relied on
this point alone. Remoteness of risk is an accepted basis for limiting
disclosure. The issue would then become whether a risk as great as
death or paralysis at these odds must be disclosed.
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sible x-rays. 5 The clear implication of this footnote is that there
existed other types of media which might have been used on Dr.
Nishi if he had been in a position to make an intelligent choice.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, with the difficulties created
by the battery-negligence confusion discussed in the dissenting
opinion,56 the court asserted that the evidence
brought defendants' omission to disclose clearly within the excep-
tion to the duty of full disclosure which excuses the withholding of
information for therapeutic reasons. Under the showing made, we
do not think that reasonable minds can differ on this point.57
In light of the fact that Dr. Nishi had already endured a history of
medical hardship, could have had a choice of different doctors or
different chemicals, and was faced with a risk of extreme magnitude
despite favorable odds, it may be that reasonable minds could cer-
tainly differ over whether or not Dr. Nishi should have been placed
in a position to make these decisions by being fully apprised of the
possible consequences of the proposed treatment.
A reading of the cases and articles in the area of informed con-
sent reveals many ill-considered pronouncements along the lines
of Partick v. Sedwick and Nishi v. Hartwell. The various implica-
tions of this exception to disclosure must therefore be examined.
At least seven results can occur when an overly emotional or un-
stable patient receives a full disclosure of the risks involved in
a treatment which the physician recommends: (1) he may not be
any more anxious or upset than he already is with the prospect
of treatment; (2) he may submit to the treatment with no ill effects
caused by increased anxiety; (3) he may submit to the treatment
and suffer ill effects caused by increased anxiety; (4) he may refuse
to submit to treatment, retaining the dangers or discomforts of his
ailment, but having no ill effects from the anxiety; (5) he may
refuse to submit to treatment and become worse as a result of the
anxiety caused by the disclosure and subsequent decision not to
undergo treatment; (6) he can postpone treatment until he feels
capable of undergoing and coping with the possible risks involved;
and (7) he can seek alternative treatment.
Cases and articles rarely distinguish between these potential
outcomes and tend to limit their discussion of the potential im-
pact of full disclosure to the vague possibility of creating "un-
necessary anxiety and apprehension which such appraisal might
55 Id.
56 See note 50 supra.
57 52 Haw. at 195, 473 P.2d at 121.
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arouse in the mind of the patient."5 8 This attitude assumes that
there is no alternative to immediate treatment, and that anxiety
will in fact result and will in fact be detrimental.59 It also assumes
that either possibility (3) or (5) will occur, and that either must
be avoided. In effect, the possibility of two potentially harmful
results occurring out of a total of seven potential results is justifica-
tion for non-disclosure. There is also at work the assumption that
since the probability of the undisclosed risk actually occurring is
small, any apprehension or anxiety should be avoided and consid-
ered unnecessary. This, however, begs the question.
Protecting the patient from undesirable psychological side-effects
appears to be morally defensible only where the patient would
have undergone the treatment regardless of the risks.6 0 The catch,
however, is that the physician can never be sure that the patient
would subject himself to those risks unless the patient himself
is consulted. There is nothing morally defensible about inducing
a human being to undergo something which he would not have
voluntarily undergone had he known of the possible consequences.
The result of inadequate disclosure is bound to be the same despite
the physician's motive if the undisclosed risk becomes a post-treat-
ment reality-the patient is likely to feel that he has been deprived
of the right to make decisions about his own body, and a law suit
may occur.
The physician, if he feels medically justified in withholding
disclosure for any reason, can do little either to protect himself
further or to comfort his patient. He may not attempt to quiet the
patient's nerves by telling him "no danger can result" when in
fact the physician knows danger can result from treatment. 61
"Often 'affimative misstatement 'is but a synonym for 'fraudulent
misrepresentation.' "62 It is also well settled that the "physician
must specifically and fully answer questions about risks put him
58 Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453, 458 (Alaska 1964). See also Williams
v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Karchrer, supra note
8; Oppenheim, supra note 6; Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7, at
642.
59 It is this author's belief that the true and basic feeling of such authors
is that the patient will not defer to the physician's judgment that he
ought to undergo the proposed treatment. This deference to and belief
in the "doctor knows best" theory entirely overlooks the realities of
the Cardozo maxim quoted at the opening of this paper.
60 See generally Plante, supra note 8.
61 See Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
62 LO ISELL & WiLLiAMS, supra note 5, at 549.64. See also Natanson v. Kine,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
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by the patient,"63 even if he does not want to fully inform the
patient. A physician operating in a manner specifically prohibited
by the patient will probably be liable for a battery6 4 in most cases.65
Thus, a physician may not fraudulently mislead the patient, must
answer all questions regarding the proposed treatment, and cannot
treat a patient against the patient's will. It appears that those
patients who may be subjected to less than full disclosure by their
doctors are those individuals who fail either to ask the proper
questions"6 or have such a limited knowledge of the proposed treat-
ment that they cannot anticipate which part of their body to
protect through timely protest. Adequate disclosure to an individual
who the doctor feels should not be either deterred from treatment
by fear, or weakened by anxiety, must not depend upon a random
request to know the risks. The situation should never be such
that "[o]nly if the patient asks, should full disclosure be made. 17
Nor should doctors be compelled to be silent to questions by the
patient or fear making encouraging remarks.
Beyond the unnecessary strains which limited disclosure puts
upon the physician-patient relationship there are other sound
grounds for not allowing a physician to proceed with a treatment
without full disclosure. First, if the physician gives less than full
disclosure, the patient will be submitting to treatment unaware
of the risks of the particular treatment. Second, since physicians
in various areas of medicine may only be held to the professional
standards of their school of technique,66 treatment for the same
medical problem by a physician with a different medically accepted
approach might involve different risks which the patient might be
willing to undergo. The patient may seek out other physicians only
after learning of the risks from the first physician. Third, the anxiety
63 LomsSELL & WILLIAmS, supra note 5, at 594.63.
64 See McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, supra note 10, at 403. See also Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83
N.J.L. 20, 25, 83 A. 948, 950 (1912).
65 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7, at 648, discuss a possible exception
to operative procedures undertaken in the face of specific prohibition:
"[W]here death is substantially certain and the proposed therapy has
an extremely high probability of success ... [t]here is authority that
the phyisican can proceed with treatment in such a situation even in
the face of adamant refusal of consent by the patient."
66 An interesting consideration arises when one attempts to determine
what type of question may compel full disclosure by the physician.
Can the patient simply ask the physician "what are the risks" or must
he be more specific.
67 LouisELL & WILLTas, supra note 5, at 594.54.
68 Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 257, 232 A.2d 840, 848 (1967).
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sensed by the physician who intends to withhold full disclosure
may result from a lack of confidence by the patient in that same
physician. For example, a patient may feel quite comfortable going
to a family doctor for regular check-ups and yet not feel comfort-
able undergoing a major operation by that same doctor. Thus, the
anxiety a physician senses when talking with the patient about that
physician performing major treatment may be the very thing
which keeps the physician from full disclosure. It would be ironic
for a patient who does not have full confidence in his doctor for
major treatment (although perhaps for minor treatments and check-
ups) to be subject to precisely that which the patient would reject
because of the relationship.
The intricacies of this last example suggest an extreme situation,
but consultation with more than one physician and exposure to
various approaches toward treatment of the same problem may go
a long way to relieve the tensions a doctor perceives. In fact, a
doctor who feels he cannot disclose various risks of treatment for
certain reasons should direct the patient, who already knows his
medical problem, to visit another physician, preferably of another
medically accepted approach in the same field. Not only will this
relieve the physician from making a singular judgment with regard
to the patient's ability to cope with the risks, but it may offer the
patient an alternative treatment with greater or lesser risks, or
at least increase the patient's confidence in the physician so that
the ultimate disclosure will not produce the expected anxiety.6 9
Since the need for treatment will, in most cases, be confirmed in
the patient's mind, he is then more adequately prepared to weigh
the risks of treatment against the risks of foregoing treatment.
If chances are to be taken, it is the patient's right to decide which
chances they will be.
Some commentators 70 have suggested that the problems inherent
in withholding disclosure from anxiety ridden patients can be
69 The existence of more than one medically accepted approach to the
same ailment may at first confuse the patient and increase his anxiety;
this is a reality which must be accepted. The occasional possibility
of selecting among treatments with different risks has obvious ad-
vantages for the patient, as does the opportunity to consult with two
physicians. For example, in Nishi v .Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d
116 (1970), the patient could have had the choice between different
radio-opaque contrast media to be used in a thoracic aortography to
determine the existence of aneurysm. The alternatives involved differ-
ent risks and different benefits in that case.
70 See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 594.47; Smith, supra note
14; Smith, supra note 2; Note, Physician and Patient: Some Problems of
Consent, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 158, 170 (1962).
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avoided by consulting with or obtaining consent from close rela-
tives of the patient. This frequently mentioned solution to the prob-
lem of limited disclosure lacks a sound basis in both present law
and policy. This erroneous idea must also be put to rest, for our
law rightfully does' not provide for such a possibility.
Unless an individual is either a minor7 1 or non compos mentis72
or unless a guardianship or power of attorney has been legally
granted, no individual may act for another individual without his
specific consent. Thus, unless family members are specifically given
power by the patient or the court to consent to treatment based on
facts not to be told to the patient, they cannot do so. Some articles 73
and cases 74 have recognized this.
The only case which has even suggested that such a power of
consent without legal authorization exists is Lester v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co.,75 which held:
71 See the sources cited at note 23, supra.
72 See the sources cited at note 24, supra.
7- See generally LouisELL & WLLIas, supra note 5, at 594.64 (at 594.64
Louisell and Williams put into correct light the statement they make
at 594.47, supra note 60); Kelly, supra note 14; Powell, supra note 14,
at 216; 14 CnN. L. REV., supra note 14, at 170.
74 See generally Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88
N.W.2d 186 (1958) (recognizing the necessity of legal authorization
for another party to make decisions); IXohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261,
104 N.W. 12 (1905) (even where a family physician was requested
to be present at the operation by the patient, the court would not
imply power for the physician to consent for the patient).
75 Lester v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 240 F.2d 676, (5th Cir. 1957).
The precise facts of this case are not clear from the Fifth Circuit
opinion. Apparently the appellant (plaintiff below) went to a psychi-
atrist who administered shock therapy, and the appellant sustained
some harm as a result. According to the circuit court the appellant
did not object to or question this procedure. Appellant appealed on
the ground of deprivation of due process and took execption, inter
alia, to "that part of the charge relating to consent and in which the
court (below) has said the jury may find that the full disclosure of
the wife may stand in lieu of disclosure to the husband." Id. at 676 n.1.(In this author's opinion such an instruction should be improper). Ap-
pellant also asserted that the court below erred in not giving the fol-
lowing instruction: "'That even if plaintiff was incompetent (by reason
of insanity or otherwise) his wife could not contract for him, in the
absence of interdiction, and second, appointment and qualification as
curatrix'." Id. at 611 n.2. From the circuit court opinion it appears that
the appellant had consented in some part and that his wife also con-
sented in some way. While the court may have found simply that thejury determined that the appellant had given adequate consent, they
instead handed down their overly broad and unsupported holding
quoted in the text which accompanies note 76, infra.
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Assuming, as we must in support of the verdict and judgment, that
the plaintiff's condition was such as to require neuro-psychiatric
treatment and, in the judgment of his physician and his wife, to
make it unsafe and unwise to require him to undergo the strain
and shock of discussing and considering the possible, though not
probable, hazards involved in, and making a decision as to, whether
in view thereof the electro-convulsive or electro-shock treatments
prescribed for, should be administered to, him; that, in the judg-
ment of his physician and his family it was desirable, indeed
necessary that they be administered; and that his wife, being
advised of and fully comprehending the situation, added to his
consent already given her consent to the administration of the
treatments, we are bound to hold that if further consent than that
already given by plaintiff to their administration was needed, the
wife could and did give sufficient legal consent, and that giving the
complained of charge and refusing the requested charges was not
prejudicial error. Any other conclusion would, we think, be con-
trary not only to human experience and sound reason but to the
teachings of our cases of Wall v. Brim, 5 Cir., 138 F.2d 478 and the
cases cited in it.76
This statement regarding a wife's power to consent for a husband
who is legally sane is as incorrect as it is lengthy.
In Wall v. Brim,77 the case relied upon to support this unfounded
thesis, the doctor at no time asserted that he withheld information
of material risks because of the psychological condition of the pa-
tient. No consent was ever given by the patient's husband. In fact,
the court remanded the case for retrial because:
[t]he issue, as to whether the defendant in proceeding with the
operation as he did after discovering its true character, without
advising plaintiff of its nature and securing her consent to it, com-
mitted a trespass upon her or a breach of his obligation to exercise
the care and skill required of him, was not developed and tried out
as it should have been.78
Wall v. Brim in no way supports the unsound holding in Lester v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. The cases cited in Wall only speak
to the necessity of an informed consent.7 9
76 Id. at 679 (Emphasis added).
77 Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th cir. 1943). In this case the defendant
doctor, while in the course of an operation on a cyst behind plaintiff's
ear, for which he had consent, discovered that the cyst was far larger
than he had originally told the plaintiff. Without advising plaintiff,
who was conscious during the operation, of the increased seriousness
of dealing with the larger cyst, he proceeded to expand his operation.
Plaintiff suffered severe permanent facial nerve damage as a result.
78 Id. at 481.
79 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) (physician may
not operate beyond the scope of the consent); Bennan v. Parsonnet,
83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912) (a surgeon may not perform an oper-
ation different in kind from that consented to, or with different risks).
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There is no foundation for allowing an individual without legal
power to make decisions affecting another's life; and there are
sound social considerations which militate against such a policy.
Suppose the physician obtains consent from a close relative of the
patient. In a properly performed operation the patient sustains some
damage which is precisely of the nature about which he would have
been warned through full disclosure. He sues the physician. The
physician-defendant produces the consent of the close relative as a
defense of his limited disclosure to the patient. Assuming that some
limited disclosure is valid, the physician would still have to prove
that in his sound medical judgment the patient-plaintiff should not
have been told of the risk. The physician's burden is precisely the
same whether or not a relative is involved-he must justify his les-
ser disclosure to the patient.80 Whether or not he must disclose infor-
mation to the patient cannot depend on the random existence of a
close relative. If it can, how close must that relative be? It would
also be unacceptable for a physician to go from relative to relative
to find someone to consent and thereby protect himself in his de-
cision to withhold information of material risks from the patient.
The doctor should never be deluded into believing that a relative's
consent diminishes his burden to prove validity of a lesser disclosure
to the patient.
There may, however, be some sound reasons for conferring
with and obtaining consent from relatives despite their lack of legal
capacity. First, should the patient die, such consent might act as
some form of estoppel against consenting relatives in a wrongful
death action. More important, assuming that there can be a valid
ground for non-disclosure, such conference with and consent from
close relatives might be evidence that the physician did everything
possible to learn about the patient, and drew upon the family's
opinions of the patient's psychological and emotional state of being.
This might bolster the physician's presentation of the basis for his
decision not to make full disclosure.
For those who theorize that non-disclosure may be rectified by
family consent, there is a further alternative. Assuming that the
family has its authority in part by virtue of its closeness to the
patient, why then should not the decision regarding treatment be
made by bringing the family and the patient together to make the
decision? Affording the family power to consent must assume gen-
erally that the patient would most likely be pleased with and
rely upon their judgment. The family should therefore be utilized
80 See 55 CAL. L. REv., supra note 18.
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by the physician to deal with the patient and to help him to make
an informed decision about the operation.
There appear to be no devices or practices available to the
physician to enable him to limit his disclosure of information to
the patient and still meet the requirements of informed consent.
In fact, there are no sound grounds for allowing a physician to
proceed with a treatment with less than full disclosure, notwith-
standing the well established exceptions. The involvement of the
family, as well as the consultation with two different physicians
as already noted, should help to diminish the patient's anxiety,
increase his understanding of the need for the operation, and gen-
erally do away with the situation in which non-disclosure might
be thought to be warranted. Ultimately, the patient may never
consent, despite the number and identity of individuals involved.
That is his right. The law has not yet, using either sound analysis
or sound precedent, promulgated a rule to the contrary.
III. BATTERY OR NEGLIGENCE?
At present confusion remains as to whether the doctor is liable
for battery or negligence when harm occurs during treatment and
the patient was not forewarned of that possibility. The characteriza-
tion of the cause of action as either battery or negligence gives rise
to significantly different ways in which the case ought to be tried
in court. Sound analysis will show that the cause of action is prop-
erly negligence and not battery.
In a law suit based upon lack of informed consent a patient
sues a physician for damages because either the patient did not
consent to the treatment or the physician did not inform him of
the risks. The patient is not required to allege that the physician
was negligent in administering the treatment.81 To state a claim
for which there may be relief, the patient need only show that
some undisclosed risk of which he should have been forewarned
did in fact result in damage to his body or that he did not consent
to the treatment undertaken.8 2
The courts have tended to be unclear in defining the nature of
the plaintiff's cause of action. 3 The confusion in the courts arises
S1 Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E. 659 (1929); Tabor v. Scobee,
254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. App. 1952); Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363,
228 N.W. 681 (1930).
S2 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs, 104-05 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
83 See generally 34 So. CAL. L. REV., supra note 6.
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over whether the cause of action is properly battery or negligence.
This confusion gives rise to more than an academic discussion of
legal niceties. A careful definition of the cause of action will help
to guide the courts in determining whether or not expert witnesses
are necessary and to what issues they should testify. A clearer
definition will also enable the judge to sharpen his instructions to
the jury both as to what alleged breaches- the jury- should consider
and the type or damages it may award.
Until 1960 malpractice cases based on lack of consent had been
decided on the theory of battery.8 4 The essence of battery is an
unconsented touching.8 5 Thus a patient who has not been informed
of certain risks has not consented to touches involving those risks,
and if one of the risks manifests itself in a harm, he claims damage
under the theory of battery. The courts, however, have confused
the issue by using battery.
The proper inquiry in a case based on battery is whether or not
the patient did consent and was informed. This is a question of fact
for which expert witnesses are not necessary.86 The courts, however,
have tended to allow expert witnesses to testify and in this way
bring into issue whether or not the physician was exercising sound
professional judgment in limiting his disclosure.87 In a traditional
battery case the question is whether or not the party consented to
the touching; the attenuating circumstances of the intent of the
defendant or the professional judgment of the defendant should not
enter into consideration.
A battery theory is often applied to the situation in which the
physician carries his treatment or operative procedure substantially
beyond the original plan or to a different part of the body.88 This is
not an informed consent situation in which undisclosed risks are
involved. Here an undisclosed treatment is involved, and the result
is more aptly described as exceeding the scope of the original treat-
ment. There is no consent whatsoever to this touching. Battery is
perfectly applicable to this form of malpractice.89
84 Id.
85 PRossER, supra note 82, at 36.
86 Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 189, 354 P.2d 670, 673 (1960).
87 Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Williams v.
Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Roberts v. Young, 369
Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517,
88 S.E.2d 762 (1955);LouisELL & WnixAms, supra note 5, at 594.48.
88 E.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
89 PRossER, supra note 82, at 104.
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The primary difficulty with using the battery theory is this.
In the situation in which a physician withholds information con-
cerning risks involved in a treatment and in which the patient gives
consent to that treatment (without knowledge of such risks), there
is a consent to the touching-that is, a consent to the treatment as
the patient understands it. In essence, the plaintiff-patient would not
be able to argue that he did not consent to the treatment (since
he did), but would have to argue that he did not consent to a
treatment which included the risks to which he was subjected.
The focus therefore is not so much on the patient's lack of consent
as it is on whether the physician misinformed or misrepresented
by omission or otherwise the nature of the treatment to which the
patient was subjected. The jury, therefore, in reality will not
be deciding liability on grounds of whether there was consent but
rather on whether or not the defendant was justified in doing what
he did-that is, whether his omission or misrepresentation was
sufficiently material to change the nature of the treatment as under-
stood by the plaintiff, thus invalidating the consent, or whether
the plaintiff would have nonetheless undergone the treatment had
he known the risks. If the jury finds for the defendant and must
use a battery theory, it can only do so by applying some form
of constructive consent by the plaintiff to undertaking the risks in
issue. It cannot find "implied consent" since there are no acts of
any kind by the plaintiff which give grounds for implying that
he consented to something he knew nothing of.90 There is no basis
at law for "constructive consent" to battery, and the entire un-
necessary fiction can be avoided by relying on negligence.
Negligence theory provides a more adequate and flexible tool
for working in this sensitive area. The negligence alleged would be
the physician's failure to disclose or failure to effectively com-
municate with the patient. Expert testimony would properly be
admitted to address questions concerning the treating physician's
judgment, the generally acceptable professional practice for the
treatment in issue, and even the psychological and emotional con-
dition of the patient. Marcus L. Plante, in an article entitled "An
Analysis of Informed Consent,"91 deals with the advantages of
using a negligence theory. He maintains that:
[W]hen the basis of the case is medical negligence as opposed to
battery, the physician has a much wider range of discretion and
the elements weighed in evaluating his conduct are more numerous.
These authorities warrant the conclusion that when a physician
9o Id. at 102.
91 Plante, supra note 8.
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tells a patient what he proposes to do, he has a strict duty to ex-
plain the nature and character of the procedure in terms that the
patient can understand, but that when the physician is consider-
ing whether he should disclose collateral hazards to the patient
he may take into account things other than the plain use of
language. This conclusion has important implications in subsequent
litigation. A physician sued in battery has relatively little "elbow
room!' in which to establish a defense. A physician sued for medical
negligence in failing to disclose hazards has many more possibilities
on which to base a defense under the circumstances that existed.9 2
As a negligence issue the physician-plaintiff can also attempt
to prove that the patient would have nonetheless undergone the
operation. By doing so the physician-defendant proves that his
withholding of disclosure was not the proximate cause of the
injury 3 Such proof that a patient would have consented anyway
should be a non sequitur in a battery allegation since the issue is
whether the patient in fact consented. Because a patient-plaintiff
will invariably testify that if he had known of the risk he would
never have undergone the treatment,94 the proper question to put to
the jury should be: "Would a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
position have undergone the treatment had he known of the material
risks involved?"95 The patient-plaintiff may testify that there was
some other treatment with other risks which he would have under-
gone, but this too is for the jury to consider. If there are alterna-
tive methods of treatment, each involving different risks, the jury
is free to decide that the patient might well have elected a different
treatment or no treatment at all. If the jury decides that the patient
would have undergone a different treatment without the same risks
or would not have undergone treatment at all, then the physician
will be liable for the damages incurred.
Negligence is also more realistically adapted to the award of
damages. The award is a straightforward compensation for the
harm suffered. 96 In contrast, if battery were to be used, there should
be the possibility of an award for actual, nominal and punitive
damages.9 7 The actual damages would be the same as those awarded
in a finding of negligence. Nominal damages are those awarded for
the mere showing of battery, even if no actual damage or harm
92 Id. at 656.
93 See PRossER, supra note 82, at 238-39.
94 Johnson, supra note 16, at 185.
05 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7, at 647. This test is discussed at note
22, supra.
906 PRossER, supra note 82, at 143.
97 Id. at 35.
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exists.9 8 Punitive damages are awarded when the jury finds the
battery to be an especially egregious act.9 9 There is no history of
nominal and punitive damage awards in informed consent cases.
The sensitive nature of the physician-patient relationship and the
universal presumption of good faith on the part of the physician
have militated against such awards. The concept of battery there-
fore is an inaccurate device for appraising the realities of harm
to the plaintiff under an alleged breach of informed consent.
The tendency in informed consent cases has been to discuss the
sorts of considerations raised in this discussion. Such considerations
traditionally should not enter into a battery action. Negligence, on
the other hand, properly allows a broader scope of inquiry in
assessing precisely what the physician is liable for, if he is liable
at all.
IV. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION
There remains the problem of the physician who attempts
to disclose all material risks to his patient, but for some reason
is unsuccessful in his communication. The patient's consent is
therefore meaningless.
Consent ... connotes the dual elements of awareness and assent.
To establish consent to a risk, it must be shown both that the
patient was aware of the risk and that he assented to en-
counter it.100
The rule is well established that "if the consent is not 'informed'
consent it is not consent at all."10 1 It is clear, then, that the com-
munication to the patient must enable the patient to make an intelli-
gent decision concerning the proposed medical treatment. The prob-
lem which has not yet been studied is the nature of the physician's
dilemma when he is aware that the consent is uninformed and there-
fore meaningless. The following discussion is by no means ex-
haustive; it is intended to open further consideration of this difficult
area. The problem does not only involve the patient's inability to un-
derstand the descriptions given to him by the physician, but it also
encompasses the language and approach used by the physician. The
explanation given to the patient by the physician, often with a
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7, at 643.
101 Note, Physician and Patient:Some Problems of Consent, 2 WASHBURN
L. J. 158, 165 (1962); see Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
170 (1960); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955); Wilson
v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
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thought to making the risks as palatable as possible, must none-
theless be sufficient adequate and clear to allow satisfactory under-
standing of what exactly is involved. This suggests that a physician
may not tailor his remarks too much, nor remain silent about any
material risks.10 2 To do so might result in nullifying the legal effect
of any consent the patient might give.103
"[T]o be able to consent the patient must be able to comprehend
the seriousness of his condition, the nature of the proposed treat-
ment or operation, the expected results, and possible consequences
thereof."'1 4 If these elements are lacking, the assent to treatment by
the patient may not be an informed consent. If the patient lacks the
intelligence to understand the treatment or risks, the physician is
faced with a communications and education problem. If the patient
has diminished mental capacity or is insane, there is nothing the
physician can do to guarantee an informed consent except to have
a guardian appointed.
There is a burden on the physician to determine the state of
the patient's capacity to understand and therefore the nature of
his consent. Walt and Scheuneman maintain that "[t]he proper
question is whether a reasonable man would conclude from the
patient's behavior that he was aware of the risk and that he mani-
fested a willingness to encounter it."1°5 It may seem unduly burden-
some to bind the physician not only to decide what and how to
disclose, but also whether the patient understood and consented
to the treatment and its attendant risks. However, the physician
is the only party in a position to carry out such appraisals.
The physician's burden is not that great, however. Waltz and
Scheuneman's formulation' 6 should lead to the conclusion that the
physician is not expected to analyze the patient's behaviour with
the skill of a psychologist but may only be held to the standard
of a reasonable man. Experts therefore will not testify as to the
ways in which the physician should have recognized certain be-
havior on the part of the patient which an expert in human behavior
and psychology would have determined to be lack of understanding
or lack of consent.
Problems of both informing and consenting may be mitigated
through the use of practices already discussed in this article. In-
102 See generally the sources at notes 61 and 62, supra.
103 NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 158 (1957).
104 Powell, supra note 14, at 208.
105 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 7, at 645.
300 Id.
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volvement of a second physician as well as members of the patient's
family in both the disclosure of information and the establishing
of informed consent can offer the physician a great deal of pro-
tection.
While this article has been primarily concerned with inadequate
disclosure there remains the occasionally expressed fear that "tell-
ing the patient too much might be worse than telling him too
little."'10 7 Such arguments concerning disclosure of "too much" in-
formation lack the requisite focus to be meaningful. Legally, there
are no grounds to hold a physician liable for psychological or
physical damage which might result from a good faith representa-
tion of risks involved in a particular medical treatment. No court
has in any way intimated such an undesirable idea.10 8 Telling the
patient "too much" about his impending treatment might be harm-
ful if the physician indulges in describing to the patient in overly
imaginative, descriptive and elaborate detail all of the aspects of
his treatment. There could possibly be an undesired emotional im-
pact on the patient. No physician, however, is required to do this.
The physician need only disclose the risks and the nature of the
treatment; he need not describe his technique and procedure in de-
tail. Disclosure of material risks is not to be construed as disclosure
of all conceivable risks.10 9 The physician need disclose only enough
to enable the patient to make an intelligent decision about under-
going treatment. In essence, the professional judgment and exper-
ience of the physician must guide him in the extent of his disclosure
beyond that minimum which informs the patient of the risks.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to argue against the hypothetical example of a
highly skilled physician deciding that his very emotionally sensitive
patient would be needlessly bothered and possibly harmed by a
discussion of the five percent possibility of a certain risk. Our tradi-
tional tendency has been to defer to the professional. Yet it is
unfair to both parties to allow this sort of situation to continue.
The physician faced with numerous technical decisions in a gen-
107 Levin, supra note 14, at 717.
108 While there are no cases holding that a physician can be liable for
distress caused by accurate good faith representations, there is the
somewhat bizarre case of Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152
N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958), in which a physician who had
caused X-ray burns was held liable for the mental anxiety ("cancer-
phobia") suffered by the patient after the patient was later told by
another physician that cancer might develop in the area of the burns.
109 See the sources cited at note 26 supra.
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erally overburdened practice is rarely a psychologist and should
not be required to make such appraisals-the patient should not
be deprived of his right to decide what should be done to his own
body.
It is doubtful whether the point of view here presented, which
would compel greater disclosure by physicians, will find favor
among the members of the medical profession. Yet the arguments
presented here are the inevitable conclusion of a reading of the
Cardozo maxim" 0 in light of modern social trends. With increas-
ingly widespread higher education the presence of more than
one physician in most communities and a decline in the in Zoco
parentis deference to professionals, individuals are less willing to
allow decisions to be made by others which are of central concern
to their own lives.
The medical profession stands to benefit from more clearly
established requirements of disclosure which shift the burden of
decision-making to the patient. In defense of less rigid requirements
of disclosure by the physician, one commentator observed that "a
surgeon cannot operate if one hand holds Gray's Anatomy and the
other hand holds Corpus Juris."': The practice of leaving broad
discretion with the physician in determining what to disclose can
only increase the need to clutch on to Corpus Juris. The multiple
judgment involving first whether the patient is sufficiently psy-
chologically prepared, and second what abridgement of disclosure
is warranted by the patient's state of mind presents a difficult
medico-legal decision. A full disclosure of material risks along with
the involvement of the patient's family and at least one other
physician can only help relieve the burden of legal worries from
an already overburdened physician.
110 See the text accompanying note 1 supra.
111 Levin, supra note 14, at 720.
